The turn to photography is the go-for-broke game of history.
These questions pertain to the larger project of historicizing film theory, that is, theories of film, cinema, and mass culture that are no longer current yet are somehow expected to refer to the same phenomena in our time. The word historicize in this context has come to mean a number of things. For instance, alongside the boom of new film theory that propelled the development of cinema studies during the seventies and early eighties, there have been revisionist debates on "classical" film theorists such as Sergei Eisenstein and Andre Bazin, attempts to reread canonical texts in their contexts of origin and reception and to confront them with contemporary questions.6 Likewise, there have been efforts to unearth and reprint unknown writings on film and cinema from earlier periods by a wide range of authors including filmmakers, artists, literary and cultural critics, philosophers, and social theorists.7 Beyond the archeological interest, the historical significance of these writings emerges from their oblique relation to the development of cinema as an institution, and to dominant modes of representation and reception. For writings of a more theoretical, speculative, and polemical nature tend to do more than merely explicate and ratify the logic of institutional development; they also give us a sense of the diverse and diverging possibilities once associated with the new medium, of roads not taken, of virtual histories that may hibernate into the present.8
Whether dealing with canonical or archival texts, historicizing film theory requires both reconstructing a historical horizon for the text-the circumstances of its production, its genealogy and address, the discourses in which it might have intervened-and suggesting constellations in which it raises questions relevant to current concerns. Methodologically, the two approaches cannot be separated. Reconstructing a historical horizon is in the end only another form of constructing constellations, in Walter Benjamin's sense of juxtaposing historical images from the perspective of the present. By the same token, this perspective cannot be foreshortened to a discussion of an earlier theory's current use-value. The point is 
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rather to enlist its historical distance and contingency, its very historicity, in the effort to defamiliarize our own thinking on film and mass culture, to help us formulate questions that will not merely confirm what we already know. Historicizing Kracauer's Theory of Film involves not only reconstituting the history of the text, as a process rather than product, but also restoring the dimension of history in the text, as a missing term underlying key concepts and arguments. To some extent, Kracauer's impulse to eliminate that dimension comes with the territory, the genre of "theory," or at least the kind of theory that pitches its hypotheses at a level presumably above historical variability. One factor contributing to the repression of history in Theory of Film may have been Kracauer's acceptance, late in his life, of the increased institutional division of labor among film critics, historians, and theorists. If his early writings on film and mass culture are distinguished by the attempt to mediate between these approaches (which is one aspect of his affinity with the Frankfurt School), his later works seem to resign themselves to their dissociation. The history that Kracauer tried to bracket from his film theory returns as the elusive subject of the book he considered the culmination of his work, the posthumously published History: The Last Things before the Last (1969).9
Let me briefly delineate some of the more specific implications of historicizing Theory of Film:
1. The unpublished material furnishes a bridge between Kracauer's earliest writings on film and his later film theory, a link that is systematically repressed in the book. I am referring here to the hundreds of articles and reviews that Kracauer published in the Frankfurter Zeitung during the early twenties, when he attempted to theorize the cinema from a historicophilosophical perspective informed by radical Jewish messianism and gnosticism.'0 I am setting off this strand of Kracauer's early film theory from the critique of ideology (roughly Marxist though early on antiStalinist) that came to dominate his writings in the late twenties and early thirties and that culminated in his "psychological history of German film" Traces of their conversation can be seen, in the Marseille notebooks and subsequent outlines, in Kracauer's concern with "self-alienation," a category central to Benjamin's artwork essay, as in his focus on cinematic capacities that correspond to Benjaminian concepts such as "innervation" and the "optical unconscious."'2 What is more, Kracauer makes explicit reference to Benjamin's 1925 treatise, Origin of German Tragic Drama-in particular the key concepts of "allegory" and "melancholy"-and to Benjamin's work on Baudelaire, in particular the concept of "shock" developed there. It could be argued that Theory of Film was designed to resume the allegorical vision of Benjamin's tragedy book, its implicit analysis of modernity as the petrified, frozen landscape of history. But Kracauer had to rewrite this vision from the perspective of a survivor, both in the literal sense of having survived his friend's suicide (a fate he had been seriously contemplating himself) and in a more prophetic sense of having to confront life after the apocalypse.
3. The distance between the forties materials and the later writings corresponds, at the level of intellectual history, to the transformation of Because of its peculiar historicity-the adaptation of an interwar iconoclastic, apocalyptic sensibility to a world after the catastropheKracauer's unpublished material may productively confound debates on the modern and the postmodern in relation to the cinema. Unlike Max Horkheimer and Adorno in their essay on the culture industry (also written in the early forties), Kracauer imagines new possibilities surfacing "within a thoroughly alienated environment" (T p. 218). He can do so, among other reasons, because he sidesteps the opposition of autonomous art and mass culture and discerns in the latter modes of "an aesthetic behavior vis-f-vis the organized drudgery" that elude the criteria of the former.14 Concomitantly, he rejects philosophical assumptions of totality in favor of an emphasis on endlessness and process. Thus, despite apocalyptic residues in his perception and imagery, Kracauer posits film as the episteme of a postmetaphysical politics of immanence. Inscribed in this politics, however, is the hidden perspective of Auschwitz, as a critical standard by which film's engagement with the present-the material reality of the subject in history-has to be measured.
5. More than Theory of Film, the early drafts and outlines touch on issues that were to become central to film theory in the seventies and eighties. These include the nature of cinematic reception and subjectivity, the role of the body, the relation of narrative and nonnarrative registers, of verbal and nonverbal elements, the tension between a "classical" norm and an empirical diversity of genres. The point here is not necessarily to align Kracauer with particular positions for the sake of mutual vindication but to read him as a potential interlocutor, one who might raise questions bypassed in the more contemporary debates.
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Miriam Hansen
Kracauer's Theory of Film
The most controversial aspects of Theory of Film are, on the one hand, Kracauer's notion of reality-as "physical" or "visible" realityand, on the other, his normative grounding of film in the "photographic approach," his insistence that film is "essentially an extension of photography" and that "films come into their own when they record and reveal physical reality" (T, p. ix). These assumptions have led to the charge that Kracauer disregards other parameters of filmic representation such as editing, framing, and sound, not to mention the constructedness of any photographic image-in short, that he assumes a transparent, iconically motivated relation between sign and referent. The further charge, then, has been that the photographic affinity turns into a prescriptive ontology by excluding as "unfilmic" any film predicated on dramatic narrative and theatrical mise-en-scene. By expanding the textual basis of Theory of Film I hope not only to dispel these charges but to elucidate what Kracauer's notions of "reality" and the "photographic approach" might mean in a historicized rereading of that text. I will draw primarily on the Marseille notebooks and attendant outlines, with a brief detour through Kracauer's 1927 essay on photography.
Looking at the Marseille notebooks, one cannot help being amazed by the fact that they were written at all, considering the uncertainty, poverty, and danger that confronted Jewish refugees stranded in Vichy France.'5 Almost as amazing as Kracauer's determination to begin a major book on film aesthetics while waiting for escape or deportation is the way in which, in the outline toward an introduction, he reframes his interest in film. The perspective of life after the apocalypse that informs the project, paradoxically, as early as 1940 seems to have warranted a deliberate break with the writer's concerns of the preceding fifteen years. During that period Kracauer, responding to the accelerating political crisis, had subjected the ongoing film production to a poignant critique of ideology. Now that the crisis has become an ongoing catastrophe, he retreats onto a more general, philosophical plane. Criticizing Bela Balizs's neoromantic Marxist determinism, Kracauer rejects modes of interpretation that reduce both film history and film theory to political and social causality.
The dimension which defines the phenomenon of film at its core lies below the dimension in which political and social events take place. No doubt the mission of film is bound to a particular time but in that it does not differ from any other technical invention or planned economy which seems to prevail everywhere. The second chapter, "Archaic Panorama," was to pursue film's erosion of intention and anthropocentrism from a wider perspective, emphasizing the diversity of genres and appeals that distinguished early cinema from later, more homogenized and integrated forms of cinema. For Kracauer, the mixture of actualities, scenics, trick films, broad physical comedy, filmed vaudeville acts, passion plays, and pornographic films conveyed a vision that treated the human figure as only one among a variety of objects or sights, ajumble of animals, children and adults, of things (like the pumpkins in La Course aux potirons), crowds, and streets. The "archaic camera," Kracauer asserts, is "indifferent vis-A-vis objects": while not excluding the consciously acting human being, it displays an equal interest in the "holdings" or "inventory" [Bestdnde] of the material world, be they factual or imagined, human or nonhuman. The appeal of such films, however, extends to more than the viewer's scientific curiosity; before anything else, they stimulate the senses with thrills of movement, speed, and physicality. Like more recent film historians, Kracauer associates the specific appeal of early films with the milieu of popular entertainment, in particular fairgrounds, vaudeville, and variety shows, from which they emerged. A "cinema of attractions," to use Tom Gunning's phrase, early films not only borrowed subjects, performers, and venues from this milieu, but also an aesthetics of astonishment, sensationalism, and . While the former explores the material dimension in terms of the aspects of materiality involved in film, the latter does so through an enumeration of genres, techniques, and motifs in which "film is in its basic layer" (M, 1:30). The overlap between the two chapters points to a certain circularity, if not tautology, in Kracauer's argument: the material dimension is that which film has the ability, and therefore obligation, to grasp; film comes into its own when it grasps the material dimension. In the process of revision, he seems to have dealt with this problem by distilling the chapter entitled "With Skin and Hair" into "The Spectator" and by reifying the notion of a "basic layer" into basic "properties of the medium," "functions," and "affinities" of film. While clearly somewhat underconceptualized, the notion of the material dimension outlined in these chapters is far more comprehensive and complex than the concept of "physical reality" that appears to govern the later book.23 For one thing, the material dimension does not reduce to the "visible world around us" (T, p. ix) but involves other senses as well; some of the most interesting notes concern the "acoustic basic layer," the materiality of sound, of music, noise, and speech, a topic to which Kracauer had devoted several important essays in the early thirties and to which he returns in chapters 7 and 8 of Theory ofFilm. For another, the status of the material dimension in the Marseille notebooks is not merely that of an object of representation, let alone that of a referent to which film relates in a presumably analogical, unmediated manner; as I will elaborate, the material dimension crucially includes the subject and the subject's relation to the Other.
To the extent that the material world does figure as a representational object, it is an object without telos, a virtually endless, open field-an object that may exist on a real or an imaginary plane. "In contrast with the theater ... film mixes the whole world into play, be that world real or imagined." Hence trick films and animation are as much part of the project at this stage as live-action film. Even more surprisingly, Kracauer goes on to qualify the standard of totality not, as one might expect, in terms of the possible contents of that world but in terms of the materials of representation: "the whole world in every sense: from the beginning film aimed to include sound, speech and color" (M, 1:16).
Throughout the Marseille notebooks, Kracauer discusses the 23. The definition Kracauer gives in Theory of Film seems deliberately confusing: "Physical reality will also be called 'material reality,' or 'physical existence,' or 'actuality,' or loosely just 'nature.' Another fitting term might be 'camera-reality' " (p. 28). The issue is not reality or realism, but rather materiality, more specifically "the process of materialization" (M, 2:9). This process of materialization presumes a cognitive interest directed, paradoxically, against the imposition of conscious, intentional structures on the material world. This world, however, is not an untouched, objective reality out there, but rather an alienated historical reality, a reality that comprises both human and nonhuman physis. For Kracauer, the materialist gaze reveals a historical state of alienation and disintegration, giving the lie to any belated humanist efforts to cover it up and thus promoting the process of demythologization. This is why Kracauer, even in the later book, insists on the "photographic approach." He does so in full awareness of the many ways in which photographic images are constructed and manipulated; he warns, for instance, of the ideological function of filmic images claiming to be showing a "real event," asserting the status of "indisputable evidence (or rather pseudo-evidence)" (M, 1:27). If he seeks to ground his film aesthetics in the medium of photography, it is not because of the iconicity of the photographic sign, the referential illusion it creates, but because of its temporality, the arbitrary moment of the snapshot or "instantaneous photograph" [Momentaufnahme] and the deferred-action status of all its meanings. For Kracauer, the politicophilosophical significance of photography does not rest with the ability to reflect its object as real but rather with the ability to render it strange. photographic images is indifferent toward the particular referent, toward the meanings and history of the things portrayed; rather, it extends laterally to create a presence effect of imperial, global dimensions. But the more the illustrated magazines purport to show their readers the whole world, the less those readers will be capable of perceiving that world. In analyzing this process of social blinding, Kracauer does not suggest that photography is encroaching on a presumably unmediated reality. Rather, "photographability" has become the condition under which reality is constituted and perceived: "the world itself has taken on a 'photographic face' " ("P," p. 433). Like later theorists of photography, Kracauer reads the increased circulation of photographic images as a sign of both the fear of death and its repression. Seeking to eternalize its objects in all spatial dimensions, however, the photographic present does not banish the thought of death but succumbs to it all the more. The photograph of the grandmother both extends and complicates this argument. Kracauer contrasts the photographic image of the grandmother with the "memory image," which is ultimately condensed in the "monogram of the remembered life" ("P," p. 429). For those who still knew the grandmother, the memory image fleshes out and revises the photographic image. But later generations perceive in the photograph of the grandmother only a specter in an outmoded costume, a bad amalgamation of disintegrated elements. It is not the preserved presence of the grandmother that moves the beholder but, on the contrary, her reduction to a spatialized configuration of time. This is what makes the beholder of old photographs shudder ("P," p. 431)-and makes the grandchildren giggle in defense. Like Proust's involuntary sight of his grandmother, Kracauer's photograph is disturbing because it alienates both object and beholder, because it ruptures the web of intimacy, memory, and interpretation.
Critical Inquiry
For Benjamin, in his essay on photography written four years later and in awareness of Kracauer's, there is still something in the figures of early photographs "that cannot be silenced"; something that compels the beholder "to look for that tiny spark of chance, of the here and now, with which reality has, as it were, seared the character in the picture; to find that imperceptible point at which, in the immediacy of that long-past moment, the future so persuasively inserts itself that, looking back, we may rediscover it."29 The grandmother in the photograph that Kracauer is looking at does not return the gaze across generations. For Kracauer, less overtly messianic than his friend, the breeze of the future that makes the beholder shudder is that of his own material contingency: "Those things once clung to us like our skin, and this is how our property still 29. Benjamin, "A Short History of Photography" (1931), trans. Stanley Mitchell, Screen 13 (Spring 1972): 7. Kracauer's Theory of Film clings to us today. We are contained in nothing and photography assembles fragments around a nothing" ("P," p. 431). The photograph thus in fact enables, rather than prevents, a momentary encounter with mortality, an awareness of a history that does not include us.30 It is in such moments of almost physical recognition that Kracauer grants photography the potential to offer an antidote to its own positivist ideology, its complicity with the social repression of death. By the end of the essay, the very negativity of photography, its role in the erosion of the "memory image," assumes a key function in the historical confrontation of human consciousness with nature (which for Kracauer, as for Benjamin, comprises both inner and outer, first and second nature). For photography provides a "general inventory," a "central archive" that assembles, "in effigy the last elements of nature alienated from intention" ("P," p. 435). In this inventory the image of the diva will take its place next to that of the grandmother and the former's bangs will provoke a similar reaction as the latter's chignon.
The "unexamined foundation of nature" that photography enables us to confront corresponds to the historical state of industrial capitalist production that has created, as a seemingly autonomous reality, a society that has reverted to the state of nature:
One can well imagine a society that has succumbed to mute nature that has no meaning no matter how abstract its silence. The contours of such a society emerge in the illustrated journals. Were it to last, the consequence of the emancipation of consciousness would be its own eradication; nature that consciousness failed to penetrate would sit down at the very table that consciousness had abandoned. Were this society not to prevail, however, then liberated consciousness would be given an incomparable opportunity. Less enmeshed in the natural bonds than ever before, it can prove its power in dealing with them. In the book, the relation of film and horror plays a relatively minor role and is explicitly addressed, only briefly, in the section entitled "The Head of Medusa." In the Marseille notebooks, however, the dimensions of horror and catastrophe constitute a framing assumption of Kracauer's concept of the material world; everything in that universe is, before anything else, a fragment of a fallen world, a landscape of ruins and corpses reminiscent of Benjamin's book on the Baroque tragic drama. As in the photography essay, this world of death "in its independence from human beings" ("P," p. 435) is not just an objective correlative of an existential human condition manifesting the distance from a hidden God; it is, above all, a historical configuration that makes human beings in the twentieth century confront their social reality as second nature, as seemingly independent, alien and monstrous, intransigent to political argument and agency.
If film makes us confront this historical physis, it does so not only on the level of representation and subject matter but, more fundamentally, on the level of reception, through the ways in which it engages the viewer as subject. As I said earlier, the discussion of the material dimension in the chapter "With Skin and Hair" crucially concerns the subject, the "human being assigned to" or addressed by film. Resuming his earlier comparison with the "subject assigned to theater" ("the human being in long shot"), Kracauer reiterates that film by contrast addresses its viewer as a "corporeal-material being"; it seizes the "human being with skin and hair": "The material elements that present themselves in film directly stimulate the material layers of the human being: his nerves, his senses, his entire physiological substance" (M, 1:23). Pointing to the example of "archaic pornographic flicks," Kracauer comes close to describing the physical, tactile dimension of film spectatorship in sexual terms (though not in terms of gender); in striving for sensual, physiological stimulation, he notes, such "flicks" realize film's potential in general.32
Like photography, film can destabilize its viewer by staging involuntary encounters with material contingency and mortality. Discussing film's capacity to materialize phenomena that elude our consciousness, Beyond photography, however, the material structure of film-the discontinuity of individual frames and shots-predisposes it to enter into the "region of shock," "the dark depths of the material dimension, where push and pressure rule beyond the reach of meaning" (M, 2:2, 1:35). If the subject of bourgeois theater is reaffirmed by a unity of vision and continuity of consciousness, the cinema undermines such fictions by its direct attacks on the viewer's senses: "The 'ego' of the human being assigned to film is subject to permanent dissolution, is incessantly exploded by material phenomena" (M, 1:23). Hence the cinema, like psychoanalysis, raises the question-and suggests the possibility-of a form of subjectivity that is not predicated on the unity and self-identity of the bourgeois individual. Given the emphasis on the shock experience, it is not surprising that slapstick comedy [Groteske]-along with, but more prominently than, the documentary-becomes the paradigmatic genre of film in its "basic layer." From his earliest reviews, slapstick comedy (for example, that of Mack Sennett, Harold Lloyd, the early Chaplin) ranked high in Kracauer's attempt to theorize film as a discourse of experience in a fallen, disintegrating, and fragmented world. Like no other genre, slapstick comedy brought into play the historical imbrication of the animate and inanimate worlds, with its physical clashes of human beings turned into things and objects assuming a life of their own. In the Marseille notebooks, Kracauer resumes his early endorsement of slapstick comedy (despite occasional complaints about it in the late twenties and thirties) as a genre that systematically confronts intentionality with "material life at its crudest" ("the shock troops of unconquered nature"), a genre whose sole purpose, he asserts, is "to perform games in the material dimension" (M, 1:39-40). While it is sociologically relevant that slapstick comedy flourished in the United States (as a response to the most advanced forms of capitalist rationalization),38 it assumes a more general significance in the 35. Derived from psychoanalytic discourse, the term innervation was used by Benjamin for conceptualizing historical transformation as a process of converting images into somatic and collective reality. Teddie says the term "dialectical" is too weak because such a process between the whole and its elements occurs in any work of art. What happens in the film is, according to Teddie, this: the artistic totality in the film comes about by the organization of disintegration. As Teddie says: die Bruchstellen zwischen den Fragmenten stellen die Chiffreschrift dar die den Sinn des Ganzen ergibt [the ruptures between the fragments represent the cyphered script which yields the meaning of the whole]. That is, the organizing principle asserts itself in the "montage" of the disruptions. Most important: not to speak of dialectical process in the film. Disintegration goes beyond dialectic.
